Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a “legitimate authority” has received relatively little attention. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and the debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. The first section analyzes the authority criterion and reveals that there are at least two distinct moral claims associated with it, each requiring separate evaluation. The second section outlines an increasingly influential “reductivist” approach to just war theory, explaining how this approach grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. The third section sketches the most promising strategies for providing a qualified defense of authority, while acknowledging the further questions and complications these strategies raise. Importantly, the article aims to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.
Full article available to subscribers only. Click here for access.
More in this issue
Summer 2017 (31.2) • Review Essay
Shifting International Security Norms
In this review essay, Denise Garcia draws on two recent books to argue that new technology can reinforce security norms just as easily as it ...
Summer 2017 (31.2) • Essay
Securing Protection for De Facto Refugees: The Case of Central America’s Northern Triangle
The Northern Triangle of Central America is one of the most violent regions of the world. However, those fleeing the violence are unable to find ...
Summer 2017 (31.2) • Feature
The Perspective of the Rebel: A Gap in the Global Normative Architecture
In this article, Christopher Finlay writes that the failure to take account of what he calls the “Rebel Perspective” constitutes a source of instability within ...